The Kantian moral respect for the will and rational nature of others contrasts with the Hegelian sentiment that "All worth which the human being possesses -- all spiritual reality, he possesses only through the State." To find meaning in something larger than oneself is noble, but this becomes poisonous when the "something larger" is interpreted as only meaning government and the state, to the point where a particular kind of political activism becomes viewed by educators (following Dewey?) as the only moral and enlightened thing.
Part 1. Philosophical Foundations for Kantian Theology
1. The Tree of Melancholy: Kant on Philosophy and Enthusiasm Gregory R. Johnson
2. Kant on the Rational Instability of Atheism John E. Hare
3. Overcoming Deism: Hope Incarnate in Kant's Rational Religion Christopher McCammon
4. The Anatomy of Truth: Literary Modes as a Kantian Model for Understanding the Openness of Knowledge and Morality to Faith Gene Fendt
Kant, Immanuel | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
denied the first, by taking the equivalent of Kant's Transcendental Deduction as itself a part of metaphysics and a proof, by means of novel principles of "dialectical" logic, of moral and metaphysical truths.
Kantian Philosophy | Immanuel Kant | Morality
Unlike the greatest of earlier German philosophers, , Kant was not himself much of a mathematician, so the theory was not given a mathematical form until the great French mathematician Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827) did so in 1796.
Philosophy of Religion » The Kantian Moral Argument
Having examined two central parts of Kant's positive project intheoretical philosophy from the Critique of Pure Reason, transcendentalidealism and the transcendental deduction, let us now turn to hispractical philosophy in the Critique of Practical Reason. Since Kant'sphilosophy is deeply systematic, this section begins with a preliminarylook at how his theoretical and practical philosophy fit together (seealso section ).
The best known moral argument is that of Immanuel Kant
Kant identifies the categories in what he calls the metaphysicaldeduction, which precedes the transcendental deduction. Verybriefly, since the categories are a priori rules for judging, Kantargues that an exhaustive table of categories can be derived from atable of the basic logical forms of judgments. For example, accordingto Kant the logical form of the judgment that “the body is heavy” wouldbe singular, affirmative, categorical, and assertoric. But sincecategories are not mere logical functions but instead are rules formaking judgments about objects or an objective world, Kant arrives athis table of categories by considering how each logical function wouldstructure judgments about objects (within our spatio-temporal forms ofintuition). For example, he claims that categorical judgments express alogical relation between subject and predicate that corresponds to theontological relation between substance and accident; and the logicalform of a hypothetical judgment expresses a relation that correspondsto cause and effect. Taken together with this argument, then, thetranscendental deduction argues that we become self-conscious byrepresenting an objective world of substances that interact accordingto causal laws.
Kantian Moral Philosophy | SpringerLink
In order to be self-conscious, I cannot be wholly absorbed in thecontents of my perceptions but must distinguish myself from the rest ofthe world. But if self-consciousness is an achievement of the mind,then how does the mind achieve this sense that there is a distinctionbetween the I that perceives and the contents of its perceptions?According to Kant, the mind achieves this by distinguishingrepresentations that necessarily belong together from representationsthat are not necessarily connected but are merely associated in acontingent way. Consider Kant's example of the perception of a house(B162). Imagine a house that is too large to fit into your visual fieldfrom your vantage point near its front door. Now imagine that you walkaround the house, successively perceiving each of its sides. Eventuallyyou perceive the entire house, but not all at once, and you judge thateach of your representations of the sides of the house necessarilybelong together (as sides of one house) and that anyone who denied thiswould be mistaken. But now imagine that you grew up in this house andassociate a feeling of nostalgia with it. You would not judge thatrepresentations of this house are necessarily connected with feelingsof nostalgia. That is, you would not think that other people seeing thehouse for the first time would be mistaken if they denied that it isconnected with nostalgia, because you recognize that this house isconnected with nostalgia for you but not necessarily for everyone. Yetyou distinguish this merely subjective connection from the objectiveconnection between sides of the house, which is objective because thesides of the house necessarily belong together “in the object,” becausethis connection holds for everyone universally, and because it ispossible to be mistaken about it. The point here is not that we mustsuccessfully identify which representations necessarily belong togetherand which are merely associated contingently, but rather that to beself-conscious we must at least make this general distinction betweenobjective and merely subjective connections of representations.